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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
A five-year statute of limitations applies to any “action, 
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462. In Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), the Supreme 
Court held that “[d]isgorgement in the securities-enforcement 
context” is a “penalty” subject to that five-year limitations 
period. Id. at 1639. At issue in this appeal are two different 
remedies sought by the SEC: an injunction against further 
violations of certain securities laws and an injunction barring 
participation in the penny stock industry. The District Court 
held that those remedies—like the disgorgement remedy at 
issue in Kokesh—were penalties. We see these questions of 
first impression differently and hold that because 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(d) does not permit the issuance of punitive injunctions, 
the injunctions at issue do not fall within the reach of § 2462. 
We will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the 
Commission’s enforcement action and remand the case for the 
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District Court to decide whether the injunctions sought are 
permitted under § 78u(d). 
I1 
Appellant Guy Gentile, the owner of an upstate New 
York broker-dealer, was involved in two pump-and-dump 
schemes to manipulate penny stocks2 from 2007 to 2008. In 
both schemes, Gentile promoted and “manipulated the market 
for . . . stock by placing trades and trade orders that created the 
false appearance of liquidity, market depth, and demand for the 
stock.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3, No. 2:16-cv-01619 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 
2017), ECF No. 47 (Complaint); see id. ¶ 7. 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under sections 
20(b) and 22(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b) and 
77v(a)), sections 21(d) and 27 of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78u(d) and 78aa), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the 
District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mayer v. Belichick, 
605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). We accept the Commission’s 
well-pleaded allegations as true, construe them in the light 
most favorable to the Commission, and draw all reasonable 
inferences from those allegations in the Commission’s favor. 
Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341, 351 (3d Cir. 2016). 
2 “Penny stocks are low-priced, high-risk equity 
securities for which there is frequently no well-developed 
market.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 175 n.14 (3d Cir. 2001), as amended (Oct. 
16, 2001) (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 
F.2d 912, 914 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of 
New Jersey filed a sealed criminal complaint against Gentile 
in June 2012 and he was arrested a few weeks later. Gentile 
agreed to cooperate against his confederates, but the deal fell 
apart in 2016 after the Government rejected Gentile’s demand 
for a non-felony disposition. United States v. Gentile, 235 F. 
Supp. 3d 649, 651 (D.N.J. 2017). A grand jury indicted Gentile, 
but the District Court dismissed the indictment as untimely. Id. 
at 656. 
Gentile “maintains an active presence in the securities 
industry” as the CEO of a Bahamas-based brokerage and the 
beneficial owner of a broker-dealer. Compl. ¶ 82. Since his 
criminal charges were dismissed, he has expressed an intention 
to expand that brokerage and hire new employees. Id. ¶ 14 
(alleging Gentile announced plans to “increas[e] staff by 60 to 
80 employees by year-end 2017, target[] 30 per cent growth, 
and reactivat[e] ‘stalled’ expansion plans”). And he has been 
quite candid about his view of the Commission’s enforcement 
action. He called it a “witch hunt,” and stated in the news and 
on social media that he “did nothing wrong” and “never 
scammed anyone.” Id. ¶ 80. 
The Commission disagrees. In this civil enforcement 
action, filed eight years after Gentile’s involvement in the 
second scheme, it alleges violations of several provisions of the 
Securities and Exchange Acts.3 It initially sought: (1) an 
                                                 
3 Section 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77e(a), (c); section 17(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77q(b); section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77q(a); and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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injunction prohibiting Gentile from violating those provisions 
in the future; (2) disgorgement of wrongful profits; (3) civil 
money penalties; and (4) an order barring him from the penny 
stock industry. Following Kokesh, the Commission dropped its 
requests for disgorgement and penalties. That left only its 
requests for an “obey-the-law” injunction and a prohibition on 
Gentile’s participation in penny-stock offerings. SEC v. 
Gentile, No. 2:16-cv-01619, 2017 WL 6371301, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 13, 2017). 
The District Court granted Gentile’s motion to dismiss. 
Id. at *4. Applying Kokesh, the Court found that the remedies 
the Commission sought were penalties under § 2462. Id. at *3–
4. And because Gentile’s illegal activity ceased in 2008, id. at 
*1, the Court dismissed the case as untimely. 
In holding the obey-the-law injunction was a penalty, 
the Court first noted that the injunction would not require 
Gentile to do anything the public at large is not already obliged 
to do, but it would stigmatize him. Nor would the injunction 
restore the status quo ante or compensate any victim of 
Gentile’s schemes. Similarly, the Court found the penny stock 
bar would punish Gentile by “restrict[ing] [his] business 
structure and methodology, in perpetuity,” without benefitting 
any victim or remediating the schemes’ effects. Id. at *4. 
Though it “underst[ood] [the Commission’s] desire to protect 
the public from predatory conduct,” the Court could not 
conclude “that, under the limited set of facts currently before 
it, the requested injunctions are anything more than a penalty.” 




The default federal statute of limitations requires that 
“an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil 
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,” be brought 
within five years of the claim’s accrual. 28 U.S.C. § 2462. In 
Kokesh, the Supreme Court held disgorgement, “as it is applied 
in SEC enforcement proceedings, operates as a penalty under 
§ 2462.” 137 S. Ct. at 1645. The Court defined a “penalty” as 
a “punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and 
enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws.” 
Id. at 1642 (alteration in original) (quoting Huntington v. 
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)). The Court’s definition of 
“penalty” was informed by two principles. First, whether a 
sanction is a penalty turns in part on whether the wrongdoing 
it targets was perpetrated against the public, rather than an 
individual. Id. Second, “a pecuniary sanction operates as a 
penalty only if it is sought ‘for the purpose of punishment, and 
to deter others from offending in like manner’—as opposed to 
compensating a victim for his loss.” Id. (quoting Huntington, 
146 U.S. at 668).  
The Court held SEC disgorgement “readily” satisfies 
these criteria because (1) it is imposed for violations of public 
laws; (2) it is imposed for punitive purposes; and (3) in many 
cases the disgorged money is not used to compensate victims. 
Id. at 1643–44. The Commission protested that disgorgement 
sometimes does compensate victims, but the Court was 
unpersuaded. While “sanctions frequently serve more than one 
purpose,” a “civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to 
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as 
also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment.” Id. at 1645 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 
U.S. 602, 610, 621 (1993)). 
7 
 
According to Gentile, the Supreme Court’s definition of 
“penalty” applies equally to injunctions prohibiting future 
lawbreaking and participation in penny stock offerings. There 
is no question the Commission’s action is to enforce what 
Kokesh described as “public laws.” Id. at 1643; see SEC v. Teo, 
746 F.3d 90, 101–02 (3d Cir. 2014). So this case turns on 
whether the remedies the Commission seeks are imposed for 
punitive reasons.  
III 
Both remedies are found in 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).4 The 
Commission’s general authority to seek injunctions against 
ongoing or threatened violations, § 78u(d)(1), states: 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that 
any person is engaged or is about to engage in 
acts or practices constituting a violation of any 
provision of this chapter, [or] the rules or 
regulations thereunder . . . it may in its discretion 
bring an action in [district court] to enjoin such 
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a 
permanent or temporary injunction or restraining 
order shall be granted without bond. 
 
                                                 
4 The Commission has parallel injunction and penny-
stock bar authority under the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77t(b), (g). Those provisions are materially indistinguishable 
from the Exchange Act provisions we set forth below, and our 
analysis applies equally to them.  
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Section 78u(d)(1) injunctions that simply reference or restate 
the text of statutory prohibitions are called “obey-the-law” 
injunctions. 
The Commission’s authority to seek a penny-stock 
industry bar is found in § 78u(d)(6)(A):  
In any proceeding under paragraph (1) against 
any person participating in, or, at the time of the 
alleged misconduct who was participating in, an 
offering of penny stock, the court may prohibit 
that person from participating in an offering of 
penny stock, conditionally or unconditionally, 
and permanently or for such period of time as the 
court shall determine. 
Paragraph (6) does not use the word “enjoin” like paragraph 
(1) does, so first we must determine whether § 78u(d)(6) 
penny-stock industry bars are a species of injunction. Several 
considerations convince us they are.  
First, take the text. Section 78u(d)(6) authorizes a court 
to “prohibit” a defendant from participating in penny stock 
offerings. Just like a typical injunction, this is a judicial order 
“to refrain from doing a particular thing . . . . which operates as 
a restraint upon the party in the exercise of his real or supposed 
rights.” 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence § 861, at 154 (1836). It is “wholly preventive, 
prohibitory, or protective,” 4 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise 
on Equity Jurisprudence § 1337, at 3206 (4th ed. 1919), and it 
“directs the conduct of a party . . . with the backing of [the 
court’s] full coercive powers.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 
428 (2009) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 
305, 312 (1982)). 
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The statute’s structure also suggests the penny stock bar 
is injunctive. It is only “in a[] proceeding [for an injunction 
under § 78u(d)(1)]” that the statute empowers courts to issue 
the bar. Consistent with that close relation, courts use similar 
factors to decide whether to issue both industry bars and obey-
the-law injunctions. See SEC v. Kahlon, 873 F.3d 500, 506–07 
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Compare SEC v. Bonastia, 614 
F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980), with SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 
141 (2d Cir. 1995). And paragraph (6), like paragraph (1), 
bespeaks equitable discretion. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(6)(A) 
(“[T]he court may prohibit that person from participating in an 
offering of penny stock, conditionally or unconditionally, and 
permanently or for such period of time as the court shall 
determine.” (emphases added)). Because it can be sought only 
“[i]n a[] proceeding under paragraph (1),” id., a district court 
may impose a penny stock bar only “upon a proper showing,” 
id. § 78u(d)(1). Thus, like paragraph (1), paragraph (6) 
contemplates injunctive relief’s “nice adjustment and 
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs,” 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980) (quoting Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).  
Finally, at least two courts of appeals have 
acknowledged that these court-ordered industry bars are 
injunctive. See Kahlon, 873 F.3d at 508 (penny stock bar); 
Patel, 61 F.3d at 141 (director-and-officer bar). That makes 
sense, since courts have also reasoned that the statutory D&O 
bar authority merely codifies courts’ preexisting power to 
include these bars in injunctions. See SEC v. First Pac. 
Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. 
Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 521 (2d Cir. 1994). For all these reasons, 
we hold § 78u(d)(6) penny-stock industry bars are injunctive 




We next consider the question whether properly issued 
and framed § 78u(d)(1) and (6) injunctions can be penalties 
subject to the statute of limitations. We look first to the 
equitable principles governing injunctions, before turning to 
the text and history of the Commission’s authority to seek 
them.   
A 
The federal courts’ equity jurisdiction mirrors that of the 
High Court of Chancery in England in 1789, when Congress 
passed the first Judiciary Act. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 
S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999). This 
does not mean, however, that equitable relief is strictly a 
common law matter. Innumerable acts of Congress explicitly 
provide for injunctions, and courts must account for the policy 
judgments exemplified by those statutes when exercising their 
equitable discretion. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 331. But unless 
Congress clearly states an intention to the contrary, statutory 
injunctions are governed by the same “established principles” 
of equity that have developed over centuries of practice. 
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313; see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329. This 
clear statement rule applies to regulatory statutes enforced by 
government agencies. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329–30. 
Gentile’s argument that SEC injunctions are penalties, 
even when properly issued and framed, runs headlong into a 
core tenet of equity jurisprudence. “The historic injunctive 
process was designed to deter, not to punish.” Hecht, 321 U.S. 
at 329. Or as one treatise put it, a court may not by injunction 
“interfere for purposes of punishment, or . . . compel persons 
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to do right” but may only “prevent them from doing wrong.” 
1 James L. High, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions § 1, at 3 
(4th ed. 1905). This principle is a corollary to the most basic 
rule of preventive injunctive relief—that the plaintiff must 
show a cognizable risk of future harm. See United States v. Or. 
State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952). 
Besides being an element of Article III standing for 
prospective relief, the need to show risk of harm is also a 
traditional equitable requirement that applies to enforcement 
agencies pursuing statutory injunctions. See United States v. W. 
T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); Douglas Laycock, 
Modern American Remedies 278 (4th ed. 2010); Gene R. 
Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 382, 405 (1983). Unless the agency shows a real 
threat of future harm, “there is in fact no lawful purpose to be 
served” by a preventive injunction. SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 
450 (2d Cir. 1937). 
In Kokesh’s parlance, a preventive injunction 
unsupported by that showing could not “fairly be said solely to 
serve a remedial purpose,” 137 S. Ct. at 1645 (quoting Austin, 
509 U.S. at 621). Cf. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide 
Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 155–56 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, 
C.J.) (rejecting injunction that would not prevent harm and so 
“must rest upon the theory that it is a proper penalty for the 
[defendant’s] wrong” because “we can find no support [for the 
injunction] in principle”). But a properly issued and framed 
injunction is “fairly” so described, because its “sole function 
. . . is to forestall future violations.” Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 
U.S. at 333. We think this prevention principle most sharply 
distinguishes SEC injunctions from the disgorgement remedy 
at issue in Kokesh. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 
574 F.2d 90, 103 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.) (holding that 
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even if the Commission fails “to show the likelihood of 
recurrence required to justify an injunction,” courts may still 
impose disgorgement); Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC’s 
Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 
1253, 1258 (2002) (“All of these [SEC] injunctions except the 
disgorgement injunction depend on the government’s ability to 
demonstrate that, in the absence of an injunction, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of future violations.”). In short, 
injunctions may properly issue only to prevent harm—not to 
punish the defendant. 
B 
As we have explained, Congress must provide a clear 
statement to substantially depart from traditional equitable 
principles like that one. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329 (“We 
cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make such a 
drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice, an 
unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.”). 
We perceive no such intent in the text of § 78u(d)(1) and (6). 
And while this clear statement rule might suffice to decide the 
case, requiring all injunctions under § 78u(d)(1) and (6) to be 
preventive and thus bringing them out of the realm of penalties, 
we are mindful that the Kokesh Court analyzed how SEC 
disgorgement operates in practice.5 So we also analyze the 
history and caselaw surrounding these provisions. That 
analysis reinforces our conclusion but also impels us to 
                                                 
5 The disgorgement remedy addressed in Kokesh was 
not created by statute, see 137 S. Ct. at 1640, so there would 
have been nowhere to look for a clear statement of 
congressional intent to deviate from traditional equitable 
principles. See infra Part IV(B)(2). 
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reinforce the parameters within which an SEC injunction is 
properly issued and framed. 
1 
Once again, we start with the text. When the 
Commission believes a person “is engaged or is about to 
engage” in securities violations, it may bring a suit “to enjoin 
such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent 
or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted 
without bond.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1). If the suit is against a 
“person participating in, or, at the time of the alleged 
misconduct who was participating in, an offering of penny 
stock” and a “proper showing” has been made as to likelihood 
of future harm, the court may also “prohibit that person from 
participating in an offering of penny stock, conditionally or 
unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as 
the court shall determine.” Id. § 78u(d)(1), (6)(A). 
Nothing in either provision just quoted suggests 
Congress meant to depart from the rule that injunctions are 
issued to prevent harm rather than to punish past wrongdoing. 
Neither provision mentions retribution or general deterrence. 
See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1645; cf. Tull v. United States, 481 
U.S. 412, 423 (1987) (“[A provision’s] authorization of 
punishment to further retribution and deterrence clearly 
evidences that [it] reflects more than a concern to provide 
equitable relief.”). Neither shows an intent—let alone a clear 
intent—that injunctions should issue automatically on a 
finding of past violations or without a proper showing of the 
likelihood of future harm. Each uses open-ended language that 
suggests traditional equitable discretion. Compare 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(d)(1) (“[U]pon a proper showing . . . .”), and id. 
§ 78u(d)(6)(A) (“[T]he court may prohibit that person from 
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participating in an offering of penny stock, conditionally or 
unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as 
the court shall determine.” (emphases added)), with Hecht, 321 
U.S. at 321–22, 329–30 (holding no clear intent to strip 
traditional discretion in statute that provided that an injunction 
or other order “shall be granted” “upon a showing . . . that [the 
defendant] has engaged or is about to engage in [prohibited] 
acts or practices”), and id. at 327 (noting distinction between 
“shall be granted” language and statutes, like § 78u(d)(1), that 
“provide that an injunction or restraining order shall be granted 
‘upon a proper showing’” (citations omitted)). In sum, 
“[a]bsent much clearer language than is found in the [Exchange 
Act], the entitlement of a plaintiff to an injunction thereunder 
remains subject to principles of equitable discretion.” SEC v. 
Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868–69 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
banc) (Friendly, J., concurring).  
2 
The history of the Commission’s injunction authority 
leads to the same conclusion. “Prior to the labor injunctions of 
the late 1800’s, injunctions were issued primarily in relatively 
narrow disputes over property.” Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 842 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). But that changed as more and more conduct 
came to be regulated by injunction through a rough analogy to 
public nuisance. See Comment, The Statutory Injunction as an 
Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 Yale L.J. 1023, 
1024 n.5 (1948). Securities enforcement injunctions emerged 
as part of this expansion of American equity jurisprudence into 
public law enforcement. See Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC 
Injunctions, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 427, 437–39 (2001). 
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Before Congress created the SEC, states authorized 
injunctive enforcement of laws that targeted “speculative 
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of ‘blue 
sky,’” Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). Part 
of a new breed of statutory remedy, these injunctions were an 
extension of traditional equity “even less directly traceable to 
the remedial devices fashioned by the common law” than 
previous remedies that had “f[ound] a basic analogy in the 
common-law right of the state to abate and restrain public 
nuisances.” Note, Statutory Extension of Injunctive Law 
Enforcement, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1096, 1097, 1099 (1932). Those 
predecessor nuisance actions distinguished punishment from 
prevention. See Eilenbecker v. Dist. Court of Plymouth Cty., 
134 U.S. 31, 40 (1890) (“[I]t seems to us to be quite as wise to 
use the processes of the law and the powers of the court to 
prevent the evil, as to punish the offence as a crime after it has 
been committed.”), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623, 672–73 (1887) (“In case of public nuisances, 
properly so called, an indictment lies to abate them, and to 
punish the offenders. But an information, also, lies in equity to 
redress the grievance by way of injunction.” (quoting 2 Story, 
supra, §§ 921–922)). And while statutory injunctions aimed at 
fraud on the public were an innovation, they too respected this 
fundamental distinction.  
New York’s Martin Act is perhaps the best-known 
example. That blue sky law empowered the state attorney 
general to seek information and commence actions in equity or 
criminal prosecutions. See Dunham v. Ottinger, 154 N.E. 298, 
300 (N.Y. 1926). Injunction actions were meant to “stop[]” or 
“prevent” threatened violations, id., while prosecutions were 
meant to “punish” them. Id. Other states sought to use the 
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injunctive process to “stop” and “suppress” securities fraud. 
E.g., Stevens v. Washington Loan Co., 152 A. 20, 23 (N.J. Ch. 
1930). Then, responding to the 1929 stock market crash and 
the Great Depression, Congress entered the fray. See SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963). It enacted first the Securities Act of 1933 and then the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the SEC. 
At first the Commission had only one arrow in its 
quiver: injunctions against future violations of the securities 
laws.6 See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1640. Much like those 
authorized by blue sky laws, SEC injunctions were “a classic 
example of modern utilization of traditional equity jurisdiction 
for the enforcement of a congressionally declared public policy 
administered by a regulatory agency established for that 
purpose.” SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 
53 (7th Cir. 1972). For a time, courts were too quick to issue 
injunctions on modest showings of threatened harm. See 
Commonwealth Chem., 574 F.2d at 99 (“It is fair to say that the 
current judicial attitude toward the issuance of injunctions on 
the basis of past violations at the SEC’s request has become 
more circumspect than in earlier days.”). But spurred by 
renewed attention to the statute’s text and the harsh 
consequences of SEC injunctions, courts began taking a harder 
                                                 
6 Decades later, Congress granted the authority to seek 
penny stock bars. That authority came in 1990 as part of an 
amendment to the Exchange Act designed “to provide 
additional enforcement remedies for violations of [the 
securities] laws and to eliminate abuses in transactions in 
penny stocks, and for other purposes.” Securities Enforcement 
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931, 931 pmbl. 
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look at whether violators posed a real threat of recidivism. See 
id. at 99–100 (collecting cases).  
Citing Commonwealth Chemical with approval, the 
Supreme Court said of SEC injunctions that “the proper 
exercise of equitable discretion is necessary to ensure a ‘nice 
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and 
private needs.’” Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701 (quoting Hecht, 321 
U.S. at 329). To merit an injunction based on threatened harm, 
“the Commission must establish a sufficient evidentiary 
predicate to show that such future violation may occur.” Id. Our 
Court makes that determination based on factors including not 
merely the fact of a past violation, but more importantly “the 
degree of scienter involved [in the past violation], the isolated 
or recurrent nature of the infraction, the defendant’s 
recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, [and] the 
sincerity of his assurances against future violations.” Bonastia, 
614 F.2d at 912. 
Moreover, “in deciding whether to grant injunctive 
relief, a district court is called upon to assess all those 
considerations of fairness that have been the traditional 
concern of equity courts.” SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 
458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing Hecht, 321 U.S. at 
328–30). Those considerations include not only the need to 
protect the public where the circumstances of the offense and 
of the offender give rise to a substantial risk of future harm, 
Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 912, but also the stigma, humiliation, and 
loss of livelihood attendant to the imposition of the two 
injunctions sought here, whether temporary or permanent. So 
“the adverse effect of an injunction upon defendants is a factor 
to be considered by the district court in exercising its 
discretion.” Manor Nursing Ctrs., 458 F.2d at 1102; see Aaron, 
446 U.S. at 703 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“An [SEC] 
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injunction is a drastic remedy, not a mild prophylactic, and 
should not be obtained against one acting in good faith.”); SEC 
v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1978) (weighing hardship 
to defendant in approving injunction’s dissolution). In other 
words, the harsh effects of an SEC injunction demand that it 
not be imposed lightly or as a matter of course, that it be 
imposed only upon a meaningful showing of necessity, and 
when it is imposed, that it be as short and narrow as reasonably 
possible. 
These principles would be dishonored if courts aimed to 
inflict hardship instead of tailoring injunctions to minimize it. 
A preventive injunction must be justified by a substantial 
showing of threatened harm, assuring the court that the 
opprobrium and other collateral consequences that accompany 
it are outweighed by a demonstrated public need; retribution is 
not a proper consideration to support this showing. See 
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 433–35 
(1945) (striking part of antitrust injunction applicable to 
directors and officers who, though they “may have rendered 
themselves liable to prosecution,” had not been shown to pose 
a threat of future violations), supplemented, 324 U.S. 570. As 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit aptly explained, 
“[j]ustifying an injunction, even in part, in terms of propitiating 
public sentiment, is objectionable as a matter of law.” SEC v. 
First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
Nor is general deterrence a proper consideration. See Arthur 
Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(Friendly, J.) (distinguishing “injunctive proceedings, the 
objective of which is solely to prevent threatened future harm” 
from administrative sanctions used “not so much to control the 
respondent as to warn others . . . [which] has a significant 
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‘penal’ component” (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control 
of Administrative Action 267–68 (1965))). 
And the principle that injunctions may issue only “to 
prevent threatened future harm,” not to punish, Arthur Lipper, 
547 F.2d at 180 n.6, applies equally to an injunction’s scope. 
See SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d 529, 542–43 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.). Just as it is error to issue an injunction 
for punishment’s sake, it is error to broaden the scope of an 
injunction because of moral desert or to make an example of 
the defendant. That principle is implicit in the well-established 
rule that “injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to 
the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiff[].” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 
765 (1994) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 
(1979)). 
Indeed, rather than using punishment to justify SEC 
injunctions, courts must shape those injunctions to provide full 
relief without inflicting unnecessary pain. See, e.g., Patel, 61 
F.3d at 142 (“The loss of livelihood and the stigma attached to 
permanent exclusion from the corporate suite certainly requires 
more.”); Am. Bd. of Trade, 751 F.2d at 542–43. And courts 
have consistently explained that SEC injunctions must be 
intended to deter the violator from further infractions (and 
thereby protect the public), not punish past misconduct. See, 
e.g., Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 912; SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 
1361–62 (11th Cir. 2016); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 648 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 
1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 
54–56 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.). Because an injunction must 
be fully supported by threatened harm, we reject Gentile’s 
argument that a properly issued and framed SEC injunction can 
be a “penalty” as defined by Kokesh.  
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The SEC itself agrees with this approach in principle. In 
Saad, Exchange Act Release No. 86751, 2019 WL 3995968 
(Aug. 23, 2019), the Commission was asked to evaluate a 
disciplinary sanction barring an individual from associating 
with any FINRA member firm. Id. at *1. The Commission 
observed at the outset that “if a sanction is imposed for punitive 
purposes as opposed to remedial purposes, the sanction is 
excessive or oppressive and therefore impermissible.” Id. at *3. 
The Commission went on to explain that a reasonable, well-
grounded finding that the sanctioned party “posed a clear risk 
of future misconduct” such that “the bar was . . . necessary to 
protect investors” was what distinguished an “appropriately-
issued FINRA bar[]” from an impermissibly punitive bar. Id. 
at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Conversely, “[a] sanction based solely on past misconduct . . . 
would be impermissibly punitive and thus excessive or 
oppressive.” Id. at *5.  
That an injunction is permissible only where necessary 
“to prevent . . . misconduct from occurring in the future,” and 
not merely “to punish past transgressions,” Saad, 2019 WL 
3995968, at *12, is a standard to which the SEC must also hold 
itself. When it does not, the buck stops here: Lest we return to 
those days when only a modest showing was considered 
sufficient, Commonwealth Chem., 574 F.2d at 99, federal 
courts may not grant SEC injunctions except “upon a proper 
showing” of the likelihood of future harm.7   
                                                 
7 As we explain below, we perceive an important 
distinction between the statutorily authorized equitable relief 
at issue here and the administrative sanctions at issue in Saad. 




Other courts are divided on whether an injunction can 
ever be a § 2462 penalty. The Eleventh Circuit, bound by its 
precedent, held that injunctions cannot be penalties under 
§ 2462 because they are equitable. Graham, 823 F.3d at 1360. 
It went on to explain that even had that precedent not been 
established, it would hold § 2462 “does not apply to 
injunctions like the one in [that] case.” Id. The court reasoned 
that injunctive relief is forward looking, while penalties 
address past wrongdoing. See id. at 1361–62. By contrast, the 
Fifth Circuit held in a non-precedential opinion that SEC 
injunctions and D&O bars could be—and in that case were—
penalties under § 2462. SEC v. Bartek, 484 F. App’x 949, 957 
(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits declined to say whether injunctions can ever be § 2462 
penalties, instead holding the particular injunctions before 
them were not punitive. See SEC v. Collyard, 861 F.3d 760, 
764 (8th Cir. 2017); SEC v. Quinlan, 373 F. App’x 581, 587 
(6th Cir. 2010) (non-precedential); United States v. Telluride 
Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1245–48 (10th Cir. 1998). The D.C. 
Circuit has taken yet another approach in the agency context. 
That court evaluates whether an administrative sanction 
constitutes a penalty for purposes of § 2462 on a case-by-case 
basis, considering “the degree and extent of the consequences 
                                                 
applicable to the injunction context. In particular, we do not 
believe that, under § 78u(d)(1) or (6), “general deterrence . . . 
may be considered as part of the overall remedial inquiry.” 
Saad, 2019 WL 3995968, at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting 






to the subject of the sanction.” Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 
488 (D.C. Cir. 1996).8 None of this is inconsistent with our 
holdings here; these courts simply have not decided the scope 
of injunctions permitted under § 78u(d). 
In our view, the Graham court got it right. We have 
deemed inappropriate an injunction that was the functional 
equivalent of a monetary penalty. United States v. EME Homer 
City Generation, LP, 727 F.3d 274, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“Such injunctive cap-and-trade relief is the equivalent of 
awarding monetary relief and ‘could not reasonably be 
characterized as an injunction.’” (quoting United States v. 
Midwest Generation, 781 F. Supp. 2d 677, 685 (N.D. Ill. 
2011))); see United States v. Luminant Generation Co., 905 
F.3d 874, 890–91 (5th Cir. 2018) (Elrod, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (advocating our Court’s approach in 
EME Homer City), reh’g en banc granted, 929 F.3d 316 (5th 
                                                 
8 While we agree with the D.C. Circuit that 
considerations of both purpose and effect are relevant to 
whether an injunction constitutes a penalty, we believe these 
considerations bear on the authority of the district court to enter 
an SEC injunction, not on whether that injunction, while within 
the court’s power to grant, is nonetheless time barred. We 
question too the consistency and administrability of this 
approach, which appears to contemplate the imposition of both 
punitive and remedial injunctions within § 2462’s limitations 
period but of only remedial injunctions outside of it, with the 
time bar conclusively determined on appeal only after the fact. 
The approach we espouse today has the virtue of providing 
clear guidance ex ante by focusing instead on the SEC’s 
authority to seek and the court’s authority to impose an 
injunction under § 78u(d)(1) and (6).  
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Cir. 2019); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) 
(“While the Court of Appeals described this retroactive award 
of monetary relief as a form of ‘equitable restitution,’ it is in 
practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an 
award of damages against the State.”). A similar principle 
applies here. Injunctions may not be supported by the desire to 
punish the defendant or deter others, so courts abuse their 
discretion when they issue or broaden injunctions for those 
reasons. We therefore hold SEC injunctions that are properly 
issued and valid in scope are not penalties and thus are not 
governed by § 2462. If an injunction cannot be supported by a 
meaningful showing of actual risk of harm, it must be denied 
as a matter of equitable discretion—not held time barred by 
§ 2462.  
There is one puzzle we feel compelled to address. The 
Kokesh Court held SEC disgorgement is a penalty—despite the 
maxim that “[a] civil penalty was a type of remedy at common 
law that could only be enforced in courts of law,” Tull, 481 
U.S. at 421–22; see Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades 
Council of Westchester Cty., 23 F.2d 426, 427–28 (2d Cir. 
1928) (“Courts of equity do not award as incidental relief 
damages penal in character without express statutory authority 
. . . .”). If SEC disgorgement is both an equitable remedy and a 
§ 2462 penalty, could an injunction be both too? 
We think not. First, unlike § 78u(d)(1) and (6) 
injunctions, SEC disgorgement is not authorized by statute. It 
has instead been justified as part of courts’ “inherent equity 
power to grant relief ancillary to an injunction.” Kokesh, 137 
S. Ct. at 1640 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. 
Supp. 77, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). Without any textual basis, it is 
hard to see where the Supreme Court would look for a clear 
statement of congressional intent to deviate from equitable 
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traditions. Indeed, at the Kokesh oral argument several Justices 
expressed frustration that the lack of statutory text made it hard 
to define SEC disgorgement. See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 7–9, 13, 31, 52, Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (No. 16-529), 2017 
WL 1399509.  
Second, the Hecht admonition—that “[t]he historic 
injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish,” 321 
U.S. at 329—is at the core of preventive injunctive relief. By 
contrast, Tull spoke to equity more broadly. So 
notwithstanding what Kokesh might suggest about equitable 
relief in general, we do not believe it opens the door to punitive 
injunctions.  
Finally, though the Kokesh Court was careful to reserve 
the issue, see 137 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3, we note its skepticism that 
SEC disgorgement is applied in conformity with traditional 
equitable principles. Compare id. at 1640 (“Generally, 
disgorgement is a form of ‘[r]estitution measured by the 
defendant’s wrongful gain.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51 
cmt. a, at 204 (Am. Law Inst. 2010))), with id. at 1644 (“[I]t is 
not clear that disgorgement, as courts have applied it in the 
SEC enforcement context, simply returns the defendant to the 
place he would have occupied had he not broken the law. SEC 
disgorgement sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a result 
of the violation.”). For these reasons, we conclude that proper 
injunctions do not fall within the definition of penalties as 
defined in Kokesh. 
V 
 Our analysis to this point disposes of most of Gentile’s 
arguments, but a few remain. First, Gentile argues that the 
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Hecht admonition—that “[t]he historic injunctive process was 
designed to deter, not to punish”—does not apply because it is 
inconsistent with Kokesh’s treatment of § 2462. That is, Hecht 
sets forth a dichotomy—punishment versus deterrence—that is 
untenable because Kokesh holds deterrence is punitive. We 
think this overreads Kokesh. Though the Court referred several 
times to “deterrence” without elaboration, we understand those 
references to address general deterrence. See Kokesh, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1642 (“[A] pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty only 
if it is sought ‘for the purpose of punishment, and to deter 
others from offending in like manner’ . . . .” (quoting 
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668)). Our Court’s gloss on Hecht 
reflects this important distinction between restraining the 
defendant on fear of contempt and making an example of him 
to deter others. See Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 912 (noting that 
injunctive relief serves “to deter [the violator] from 
committing future infractions of the securities laws,” not to 
“punish” him for past misconduct (emphasis added)). The 
former is the very point of preventive injunctive relief; the 
latter is punitive. “When it comes to discerning and applying 
[traditional equitable] standards . . . ‘a page of history is worth 
a volume of logic.’” eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (quoting N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921)). All the more so here—where Gentile’s logic is based 
on a strained reading of a single word in a case addressing a 
different remedy.  
And unlike in Kokesh, there are few signs that courts 
issue SEC injunctions for general deterrence. True, there are 
isolated examples. See, e.g., Posner, 16 F.3d at 522 (“We 
intend our affirmance . . . as a sharp warning to those who 
violate the securities laws that they face precisely such 
banishment.”). But the caselaw in the main reflects the 
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traditional principles we have discussed. We also find it 
significant that cases prior to Kokesh addressing both SEC 
injunctions and disgorgement often discuss general deterrence 
only with respect to the latter. See, e.g., SEC v. Kokesh, 834 
F.3d 1158, 1162–64 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635; 
SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474, 1477–78 
(2d Cir. 1996); First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1228–29, 
1231–32; see also Collyard, 861 F.3d at 765. What is more, we 
have explained in an SEC case that “there is no great public or 
national interest to be served by an injunction in essence 
against a single individual.” Warren, 583 F.2d at 121. That 
would hardly be true if we sought to implement a program of 
general deterrence through injunctions. 
Part of our disagreement with Gentile stems from his 
focus on the Commission’s intent. It may well be that in its zeal 
for enforcement, the Commission more recently has tended to 
seek injunctions in part for their general deterrent effect. See 
James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 Duke L.J. 737, 751 (2003). The impetus 
may be understandable; after all, SEC enforcement actions are 
“independent of the claims of individual investors” and are 
aimed at “promot[ing] economic and social policies.” Teo, 746 
F.3d at 102 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Rind, 991 
F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993)); see Comment, Federal 
Agencies, supra, at 1048–49. But any tendency in that 
direction would be at odds with the Commission’s own 
understanding of the limits on its powers, cf. Saad, 2019 WL 
3995968, at *3–5, *12. And ultimately, rather than probe the 
agency’s rationale for seeking a judicial remedy, we look to the 
nature of the remedy itself as explained by the courts imposing 
it. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643–44 (analyzing why 
disgorgement “is imposed by the courts”); cf. Tull, 481 U.S. at 
27 
 
423 (“Thus, the District Court intended not simply to disgorge 
profits but also to impose punishment.”). 
Second, Gentile argues that because obey-the-law 
injunctions require mere compliance with preexisting 
obligations, they must be punitive. Citing Bonastia, the 
Commission responds that “injunctions that track the statutory 
language charged in a complaint are permissible in this 
Circuit.” SEC Br. 30 n.5. Gentile’s argument has some force to 
the extent that obey-the-law injunctions pose a risk of 
overbreadth, lack of fair notice, unmanageability, and 
noncompliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). 
See Graham, 823 F.3d at 1362 n.2 (collecting cases); SEC v. 
Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1233 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting 
cases); Savoy, 665 F.2d at 1318; United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 
889, 892 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1988); Laycock, supra, at 274–75. So 
in some cases—and perhaps in this one—an obey-the-law 
injunction will add little if anything to the sanctions already in 
place. There has been and continues to be “a difference of 
opinion as to whether as a general proposition injunctions to 
‘obey the law’ should be issued in order that enforcement by 
administrative agencies may be sought by contempt rather than 
by the statutory route.” SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F.2d 
457, 461 (10th Cir. 1972). 
But Gentile has not asked us to hold obey-the-law 
injunctions impermissible—he argues only that they are 
subject to the § 2462 statute of limitations. So we note only that 
the appropriate scope of an injunction against further 
lawbreaking depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
case. Courts should make this determination on a developed 
record, SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d on 
other grounds, 568 U.S. 442 (2013), assuming the plaintiff has 
stated a plausible claim for relief, see EME Homer City 
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Generation, 727 F.3d at 295–96 (affirming dismissal of claims 
for improper injunctive relief). It is true that in Bonastia we 
reversed the district court’s refusal to grant an obey-the-law 
injunction. See 614 F.2d at 910–11. We have also struck 
overbroad language enjoining parties to obey the law. See 
Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 650 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 83 (3d Cir. 1990), and 
Warren, 583 F.2d at 121). The “degree of particularity required 
of an injunction depends on the subject matter involved.” Pub. 
Interest Research Grp., 913 F.2d at 83 (quoting Calvin Klein 
Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 
(8th Cir. 1987)). Ultimately, “[t]he district courts are invested 
with discretion to model their orders to fit the exigencies of the 
particular case, and have the power to enjoin related unlawful 
acts which may fairly be anticipated from the defendants’ 
conduct in the past, but a decree cannot enjoin conduct about 
which there has been no complaint.” United States v. Spectro 
Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1976) (footnotes 
omitted); see NLRB v. Express Publ’g. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435–
37 (1941). 
We stress that the District Court, on remand, should not 
rubber-stamp the Commission’s request for an obey-the-law 
injunction simply because it has been historically permitted to 
do so by various courts. After all, Bonastia was decided almost 
40 years ago, when the landscape for SEC enforcement actions 
was significantly different than today’s. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1640. Indeed, Congress did not enact the penny-stock bar 
until ten years later. If the District Court, after weighing the 
facts and circumstances of this case as alleged or otherwise, 
concludes that the obey-the-law injunction sought here serves 
no preventive purpose, or is not carefully tailored to enjoin 
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only that conduct necessary to prevent a future harm, then it 
should, and must, reject the Commission’s request. We note 
that the District Court has already addressed some of the 
relevant concerns involved in its opinion. We are also troubled 
by the fact that the Commission appears to seek two 
injunctions that attempt to achieve the same result. 
Third, Gentile argues the penny stock bar is punitive 
because it “provides no benefit to victims of alleged past 
securities violations, nor does it purport to do so.” Gentile Br. 
27. In making this argument, he tacitly agrees with us that 
§ 78u(d)(6) penny stock bars are injunctive in nature. But then 
he cites a series of cases that involve administrative 
suspensions and debarments, not court-ordered injunctive 
relief. See De La Fuente v. FDIC, 332 F.3d 1208, 1214–15, 
1219–20 (9th Cir. 2003); Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855, 860–
61 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Johnson, 87 F.3d at 488; Saad v. SEC, 873 
F.3d 297, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
We concede some courts have used similar logic. See Collyard, 
861 F.3d at 764 (citing Riordan v. SEC, 627 F.3d 1230, 1234 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.), abrogated on other grounds 
by Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. 1635); Telluride, 146 F.3d at 1246–47; 
Bartek, 484 F. App’x at 956–57. But we think the distinction 
between injunctions and administrative sanctions makes all the 
difference. See supra Part IV; Arthur Lipper, 547 F.2d at 180 
n.6. Our analysis is, after all, predicated on traditional 
principles of judicial relief. Gentile is quite right to point out 
that exclusion from one’s chosen profession is a devastating 
sanction. But the question is not whether an administrative 
sanction can be punitive; it is whether a federal court can issue 
a § 78u(d)(6) injunction for punitive purposes. It cannot. 
Finally, Gentile argues that the obey-the-law injunction 
and penny stock bar are punitive because they do not seek to 
30 
 
restrain imminent violations. Gentile concedes, as he must, that 
an injunction against an imminent violation is not a penalty. 
See Gentile Br. 42 (“Of course the SEC has unlimited power to 
obtain an injunction against an individual who is actually 
violating the securities laws or on the precipice of doing so.”). 
He objects that his case does not rise to that standard. It is true 
that we apply a somewhat less demanding imminence standard 
in SEC enforcement cases than we do in reviewing the FTC’s 
exercise of similar statutory injunction authority. Compare 
Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 912 (“The well established standard . . . 
is based on a determination of whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again engage 
in the illegal conduct.”), with FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 
917 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 2019) (“‘[I]s about to violate’ means 
something more than a past violation and a likelihood of 
recurrence.”). But neither Bonastia nor the Aaron Court (which 
seemed to approve a test much like ours) dispensed with the 
requirement of “a proper showing.” See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701 
(“[T]he Commission must establish a sufficient evidentiary 
predicate to show that such future violation may occur.” (citing 
Commonwealth Chem., 574 F.2d at 98–100)); Bonastia, 614 
F.2d at 913 (concluding that the SEC had made “a strong 
showing” that justified the reversal of the district court and 
entry of an injunction). Nor did either suggest that the fact of a 
past violation alone was sufficient to impose so onerous and 
stigmatizing a sanction as an industry bar or obey-the-law 
injunction. Rather, even with a lesser imminence requirement, 
we insisted the showing itself be substantial and based as well 
on “the circumstances surrounding the particular defendant.” 
Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 912.  
Along those same lines, we are mindful that we are 
interpreting the meaning of “penalty” for statute of limitations 
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purposes. Even assuming a valid preventive injunction could 
be a penalty, it is hard to see when it would accrue. See 
Johnson, 87 F.3d at 489 n.7. Gentile’s argument must reject 
either Bonastia or our conclusion that § 78u(d)(1) and (6) 
conform to traditional equitable principles. We can do neither.  
VI 
SEC injunctions come with serious collateral 
consequences. Commonwealth Chem., 574 F.2d at 99; Am. Bd. 
of Trade, 751 F.2d at 535. They can lead to administrative 
sanctions and disabilities, see Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The 
Collateral Consequences of SEC Injunctive Relief: Mild 
Prophylactic or Perpetual Hazard?, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 625, 
643–68, and collaterally estop defendants in subsequent 
private litigation, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322, 331–33 (1979). Enjoined defendants suffer harm to their 
personal and business reputations. See Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. 
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 n.5 (1975) (“The moment you 
bring a public proceeding against a broker-dealer who depends 
upon public confidence in his reputation, he is to all intents and 
purposes out of business.” (quoting Milton V. Freeman, 
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law 891, 897 (1967))); 
Warren, 583 F.2d at 122; ABA Committee on Federal 
Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on SEC 
Settlements, 47 Bus. Law. 1083, 1091, 1149–50 (1992). And 
when a court bans a defendant from his industry, it imposes 
what in the administrative context has been called the 
“securities industry equivalent of capital punishment.” Saad v. 
SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting PAZ Sec., 
Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  
So we conclude by repeating Judge Friendly’s warning: 
an SEC injunction “often is much more than [a] ‘mild 
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prophylactic.’” Commonwealth Chem., 574 F.2d at 99. When 
the Commission seeks an injunction, “the famous admonitions 
in [Hecht] must never be forgotten.” Am. Bd. of Trade, 751 F.2d 
at 535–36.  
* * * 
Because properly issued and framed injunctions under 
§ 78u(d)(1) and (6) are not penalties governed by § 2462, we 
will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
